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Resumen: Las tensiones crecientes al interior de la Organización Mundial de Comercio —
OMC tienen causas internas y externas como por ejemplo la crisis financiera internacional,
los cambios en la configuración de poder mundial y una suerte de intensificación del conflicto
Norte-Sur entre los miembros del sistema multialteral de comercio, sobretodo después de la
Ministerial de Cancún y la creación del Grupo de los 20. La OMC refleja en gran medida esos
cambios y es de hecho, la primera en hacerlo, teniendo en cuenta que es el más transparente de
los organismos multilaterales y el más “fiscalizado” por sus miembros. Sin embargo, la OMC
es sólo el canario que en las minas anuncia la falta de oxigeno: moestra como una serie de
organismos resultan caducos en este nuevo escenario. Allí, los países en desarrollo vienen
logrando trabar muchas iniciativas de los países desarrollados por considerar que no responden
a sus intereses y estrategias de desarrollo. Países como Brasil e India están expandiendo sus
papeles en cuanto jugadores globales, process drivers, al tiempo que crece la heterogeneidad en
el grupo de países en desarrollo. En ese contexto, las discusiones acerca de las flexibilidades
para países en desarrollo en la OMC siguen siendo válidas. En ese contexto, este trabajo se
propone dos objetivos estrechamente relacionados. Por un lado, identificar como viene siendo
abarcado el TE&D en el sistema multilateral, desde su creación en el GATT hasta las actuales
negociaciones en Doha. Por otro lado, identificar cómo se han posicionado en ese contexto
países en desarrollo de nivel medio que participan activamente en coaliciones como Brasil,
Argentina o India. Se sostiene que el TE&D viene siendo restringido para tornarse un espacio
de flexibilidad para países menos adelantados, mientras que los demás países en desarrollo
siguen buscando bajo otros títulos nuevas flexibilidades que entienden necesarias en el sistema
multilateral de comercio desde su perspectiva de desarrollo.
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Organización Mundial de Comercio, Ronda de Doha.
(*) This paper is the result of a fellowship program taken at UNCTAD in Geneva. The author would like to thank
Vlasta Macku and her team for the opportunity awarded and contacts for interviews; Diana Tussie, Pablo Heidri-
ch, Manuela Tórtora, and Marcel Vaillant, for their comments and guidance; in addition to all the persons intervi-
ewed (negotiators, experts, and WTO and UNCTAD’s officials), without whom it would have been impossible to
learn about the informal negotiations taking place during the Doha Round. Any errors are the author’s sole res-
ponsibility.
(**) Lawyer, Master in International Relations. She is currently a researcher at the Latin American School of
Social Sciences — FLACSO (Argentina) and coordinates the Latin American Trade Network — LATN. E-mail:
jpeixoto@flacso.org.ar. Recebido em: 21.4.2010 e aceito em: 24.5.2010.
prolam 16.pmd 19/10/2010, 15:32164
165
Abstract: The current tensions within the WTO have many external and internal causes,
such as the global crisis, changes in the global power balance, and the revival of  North-South
conflict, mostly after the Cancun Ministerial and the creation of  the G-20. The WTO, to a
large extent, reflects those changes, mainly given that it is the most transparent of  all
multilateral organizations, and it is also the most accountable to its members. However, the
WTO is only the canary in the coal mine that announces the lack of  oxygen: it shows how
multilateral organizations are obsolete in this current transition phase towards a new global
scenario. In fact, developing countries have blocked many developed countries’ initiatives in
the WTO, by considering them unlike to response to their development interests. Countries
such as Brazil and India have been increasingly expanding their roles as process drivers in the
international level, while the differentiation within the group of  developing countries increases.
In this context, discussions around flexibilities for developing countries in the WTO are still
valid, whether we call them Special and Differential Treatment (S&DT), less than full reciprocity,
whether they are discussed in specialized committees or in the Committee of  Trade and
Development. The goal of  this paper is twofold: in one hand, to look for answers about how
the S&DT has been approached in the Doha Development Agenda; on the other hand, to
identify how middle income developing countries actively participating in coalitions have
positioned themselves in order to search for new flexibilities they see as necessary in the
multilateral trading system from their development perspective.
Keywords: North-South Tensions, Developing Countries, Special and Differential Treatment,
World Trade Organization, Doha Round.
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INTRODUCTION
The current tensions in the search for flexibilities for developing countries in
organizations such as the WTO is part of  the historical North-South conflict, how this
conflict has been fluctuating through time due to changes in the world power balance, as
well as the increasing heterogeneity within developing countries group.
Developing countries have blocked some of  the initiatives of  developed countries,
believing that they fail to consider their interests(1). Additionally, although emerging
countries — such as Brazil or India — still lag behind the so-called “developed” countries,
they are increasingly participating in the decisions of  important international organizations
such as the IMF, OECD, and the financial G-20. In other words, they are starting to move
away from the position of  rule takers or rule breakers within the international scenario, to
play an increasingly important role as rule makers(2) — at a regional level, and process
drivers at the global level(3).
In these times of  change in the configuration of  the international community, the
development agenda and its search for flexibilities is more relevant than ever before and
adopts many forms in different environments. In fact, if  the WTO’s agenda on Special
and Differential Treatment (S&D) is held up, countries then search for other ways to move
on under different names but with the same substantial objective: obtaining the flexibilities
they seem necessary in the international environment.
In that context, this paper has two closely intertwined objectives. On one hand, to
identify how S&D has been dealt with in the multilateral system, from its inception under
GATT to the present negotiations in Doha. On the other, to identify how middle income(4)
developing countries actively participating in coalitions have positioned themselves, as in
the case of  Brazil, Argentina, India, South Africa. What we see is that the S&D is being
restricted to be turned into flexibility room for LDCs, while other developing countries
continue searching — under other names — for new flexibilities they see as necessary in
the multilateral trading system from their development perspective.
The first section will offer a brief  historical overview on Special and Differential
Treatment, from its beginnings under GATT to the present day, analyzing it in the light
of  the WTO’s North-South conflict. The second section will analyze the S&D evolution
on specific issues, i.e. subsidies (Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures),
investment (Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures), and intellectual property
(Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of  Intellectual Property Rights). The third section
will provide a summary of  the main roads followed by several developing countries to
move forward in the search for flexibilities in the Doha negotiations. At the end, some
conclusions will be provided.
(1) See Shadlen (2009).
(2) About these categories, see S. Krasner (1977, p. 635-671).
(3) See D. Tussie (2009).
(4) We consider middle income countries those comprised within the World Bank range of  lower and upper middle
income countries.
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SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT AT THE HEART OF THE NORTH-SOUTH
CONFLICT
In the study of  international organizations, structuralist approaches hold that these
organizations reflect the underlying power in the relationships among States. They focus
on the distribution of  resources as the key determinant accounting for the results in the
international scheme(5). Furthermore, structuralist theories comprising neorealist and neo-
Marxist versions of  the hegemonic stability theory share the common vision that
multilateral trade regimes are instruments of  State power or class power. Thus, according
to structuralist views, the GATT/WTO is seen as a multilateral trading system created
to support and respond to the interests of  most industrialized countries, such as the USA,
European Union, Japan, Canada, to the detriment of  developing countries(6).
According to the neoliberal approach of  political economy, the system includes rules
that enable cooperation through information sharing, monitoring mechanisms, and low
transaction costs, although for some, it also tends to preserve the interests of  the leading
countries establishing the system(7).
Along the same lines, according to institutionalist approaches, the GATT/WTO
represents an opportunity for developing countries to obtain more positive results in the
international arena, thanks to the fact that this organization is strongly rule-oriented.
Otherwise, in the absence of  any rules, the results would be much more harmful to the
interests of  the least developed countries (LDCs)(8). Furthermore, some views state that
in asymmetrical relations, the weak are not always doomed to fail in their demands or,
more specifically, that the outcome of  international negotiations can be influenced by
developing countries(9).
Some more heterodox approaches refer to the pressure exercised by developed
countries on developing ones. In the case of  the WTO, this dynamics would involve a mix
of  rules and power, where power outweighs rules in critical times, such as at the closing
of  multilateral negotiation rounds(10).
From a more juridical standpoint, in classical theory, when analyzing the relationship
between law and power, it is stated that international law favors the status quo and, when
that is not so, it becomes unrealistic and the threat of  its violation arises(11). However,
others believe that the law plays a less relevant role in international relations, albeit not
less important to the organization of  international life(12).
At the heart of  this debate — regardless of  the discipline involved — is the power
relationship among states in international organizations, the North-South division of  the
(5) Shadlen (2009, p. 1), supra note 1.
(6) M. Tanzimuddin Khan (2004, p. 13).
(7) M. Tanzimuddin Khan (2004, p. 16).
(8) “Bad rules are better than no rules... but they are still bad rules”. Shadlen (2009, p. 6), supra note 1.
(9) I.W. Zartman; J.Z. Rubin (2002, p. 1).
(10) R. H. Steinberg (2002).
(11) H. Morghentau (2000, p. 79-85)
(12) M. Koskenniemi (2000, p. 28).
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world, developed countries vs. developing countries and, consequently, the discussion
around the flexibilities that LDCs must enjoy to make up for the asymmetry in international
economic relations and to trigger their development strategies.
While there is no intention for this WTO-driven agenda — including S&D — to
replace the countries’ domestic development strategies(13), the truth is that, on one hand,
there is no level playing field at the WTO, and developing countries need flexibilities to at
least negotiate under more equitable terms. On the other hand, it is worth noting that
international trade is not an end in itself, but a means to improve the standards of  living,
as declared in the recitals to the agreement establishing the WTO.
Development is thus still present in the multilateral trading system and the task of
analyzing issues that are the basis of  the North-South conflict is equally current, as well
as complex. For some authors, this discussion will prevail during part of  the 21st
century(14), after the end of  the Cold War and the world’s East-West division: the First
World became North and the Third World, South, while the Second World vanished (a
few countries from the late Second World became part of  the North and others, of  the
South). According to others, the increasing tensions on this issue are also a challenge to
more classical views on international relations that are developed on the premise that
cooperation leads to an increase in the overall well-being of  the international community:
in the North-South tension, interests are usually incompatible and cooperation rules are
not applied(15).
In this debate, the multilateral trading system still manifests very clear indications
of  the North-South conflict(16) and this is directly reflected on the hard struggle in relation
to the Special and Differential Treatment (S&D) and the constant re-negotiation of  its
rules, as described below.
SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT UNDER GATT
At the beginning, developing countries on the basis of  sovereign determination were
considered equal partners in the multilateral trading system, at least under the 1948-1955
GATT(17). The only provision available to developing countries was Article XVII, which
enabled developing countries to derogate from their scheduled tariff  commitments or
implement non-tariff  measures, such as quotas, in order to promote the setting up of
certain industries in their territories, that is, the protection of  infant industries(18). From
then on, the number of  developing countries participating in the GATT increased, also
increasing the pressure for more flexible rules accounting for the asymmetries of  the
system. Thus, the S&D is born as a result of  the coordination of  political efforts by
(13) As rightly mentioned by Kleen & Page in a comprehensive work on S&D (KLEEN, PAGE, 2004).
(14) See R. Reuveny; W. R. Thompson (2008).
(15) Shadlen (2009), supra note 1.
(16) D. Tussie (2010, to be published).
(17) E. Kessie (2000).
(18) A. Singh (2005).
Juliana Peixoto Batista — Cadernos PROLAM/USP (Ano 9 — Vol. 1 — 2010) p. 164-191
prolam 16.pmd 19/10/2010, 15:32168
169
developing countries in order to correct what they felt were inequalities in the post-Second
World War system, understood as preferential treatment in favor of  developing countries,
in every aspect of  their international economic relations(19).
This development paradigm, pioneered by Latin America, India, Egypt and later
supported by a wide array of  countries from Asia and Africa, was based on the need to
improve trading terms, reduce dependence on exportation of  primary products, correct
the volatility and imbalances in the balance of  payments and industrialization by offering
protection to infant industries and export subsidies, among other objectives(20).
In the following years, several S&D provisions were introduced in the GATT. Firstly,
through the amendment to Article XVIII in the GATT Review Session of  1954-55. The
new item (article XVIII:B) offered flexibilities to developing countries so as to cope with
difficulties in their balance of  payments. Later on, in 1965, the S&D was also present in
the inclusion of  Part IV to GATT, exempting developing countries from the prohibition
of  applying subsidies to exports of  manufactured goods and allowing for greater flexibility
in the use of  tariff  protections. Additionally, many developing countries entered the GATT
under Article XXVI, which enabled them to evade negotiation of  consolidated tariffs as
part of  their accession agreements.
Flexibilities in relation to market access were deepened through the incorporation
of  the non-reciprocity provision (art. XXXVI:8) in Part IV of  GATT in 1964. Furthermore,
between 1966 and 1971, the Generalized System of  Preferences — GSP and the protocol
on trade-related negotiations among 16 developing countries were introduced in GATT,
as waivers to article I (MFN).
In the Tokyo Round, which began in 1973, the efforts of  developing countries to
consolidate the special treatment in their favor resulted in the “Decision on Differential
and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of  Developing
Countries”, known as the “Enabling Clause”. The Enabling Clause comprises: a) the
Generalized System of  Preferences; b) Non-tariff  measures in GATT instruments; c)
Global or regional arrangements among developing countries, and d) Special treatment
to LDC. The concept of  special and differential treatment thus reached the core of  the
multilateral trading system.
However, at that time, developing countries started to perceive that the positive
discrimination they received under S&D was being overshadowed by the increasing negative
discrimination against their trade, so they took a tougher position(21). The end of  the
(19) UNCTAD (2000).
(20) UNCTAD (2000).
(21) Negative discrimination against developing countries was particularly apparent in relation to: voluntary res-
traint arrangements adopted directly against their most competitive exports; extension of  free-trade agreements
and custom unions among developed countries; increasing restrictions on textiles under the Multifiber Agree-
ment; higher tariffs on products of  exporting interest to developing countries in comparison with those of  interest
to developed countries; increasing application of  anti-dumping and countervailing measures; and the use of  the
GSP as a pressure tool by developed countries, which — in the absence of  more specific provisions — unilaterally
“graded” the countries that would no longer receive GSP benefits (UNCTAD, 2000, p. 27; KESSIE, 2000, p. 9).
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Tokyo Round was thus marked by great tension among the so-called “transatlantic powers”
(USA and European Community-EC) and developing countries, members of  the so-called
“Informal Group of  Developing Countries”. With the aid of  UNCTAD, this group
summarized its position on the Tokyo Round codes and set out to the battle, led by
Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, and Yugoslavia.
Although the US and the EC were in full disagreement with the position of  developing
countries and with what they called the “UNCTADization” of  the GATT — having even
planned to bring back to life the conditional MFN clause or to leave the GATT and negotiate
an agreement with the OECD — they decided to accept the position of  developing countries
to close the Round in the middle of  security and defense considerations brought about by
the Cold War(22). Thus, the Tokyo Round closed in 1979 with voluntary codes, a compromise
that reflected these tensions. Developing countries were thus able to defend their right
not accept all rules, considered by industrialized countries as the clearest evidence of  free
riding(23).
THE TURN TOWARDS THE WTO AND THE CURRENT DOHA ROUND
The Uruguay Round — UR began in a context where many developing countries
were somewhat empowered by S&D flexibilities and, at the same time, they were watching
for any discrimination against their trade. That is, they sought increased market access,
taking a more cooperative stand in view of  the promise of  including agriculture in the
negotiations, while they also intended to continue using S&D provisions. In the
beginning, they did not intend to sign such agreements as TRIPs, TRIMs, or GATS.
However, the course of  the Round led to a very different outcome from that of  the Tokyo
Round.
To begin with, the UR was open to participation only for countries that were
contracting parties under GATT or those that undertook to negotiate their accession
during the Round(24). Additionally, as the Round progressed, the Cold War was coming to
an end and US negotiators no longer had to weigh security considerations in exercising
their power to exert pressure on more reluctant countries. Furthermore, the crisis and
adjustment many developing countries were undergoing caused them to see the UR as an
opportunity to also obtain some benefit from the unilateral liberalization performed as a
consequence of  the structural adjustment programs required by international credit
institutions as a condition for bailout. All too late, developing countries realized that
agreement to adopt hard liberalization measures did not automatically imply the ability to
exercise a decisive influence on the agenda and outcome of  negotiations(25).
(22) Steinberg (2002, p. 359), supra note 10; Krasner (1976), supra note 2.
(23) Even Argentina in the midst of  an early neoliberal experiment that had drastically reduced tariffs neither
bound these reductions nor signed the codes. For Brazil, enjoying then the so-called Brazilian miracle, signing the
codes on export subsides or government procurement , would have entailed great costs.
(24) UNCTAD (2000, p. 28), supra note 19.
(25) Tussie (2010), supra note 16.
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In this context, the US and the EC deployed their coercive and bargaining power to
close the round, resorting to the old scheme of  threatening with draining the GATT.
This time, the threat was made effective by means of  a legal device in the text of  the
WTO Agreement. Article II of  the Agreement establishes that all annexes (GATT of
1994, GATS, TRIPs, TRIMs, subsidy and anti-dumping arrangements, i.e. all of  the so-
called “multilateral trade agreements”) are part of  the Agreement establishing the WTO
and binding upon all members. This was the birth of  the single undertaking. Additionally,
the agreement establishes that the 1994 GATT is legally different from the 1947
GATT.
These devices were created to avoid free-riding or a “GATT à la carte” and draining
the GATT 47, causing developing countries to accept the whole package because, once
the WTO Agreement was signed and all other agreements were consequently
accepted, the US and EC would deem their obligations extinguished in relation to the
1947 GATT(26).
The impact of  the Marrakech package on the development strategies was not
adequately weighed. The outcome of  the Uruguay Round was markedly uneven in favor
of  developed countries and dealt a hard blow to the S&D. There was no consensus among
developing countries for the adoption of  a general “umbrella” framework for S&D
provisions, although there were not many chances of  fighting for that either. Developing
countries were at a crossroads — would they accept all the rules and obligations resulting
from the negotiation or would they remain outside the organization?(27). As a matter of
fact, the single undertaking resulted in causing developing countries and developed
countries to assume very similar undertakings(28), based on rules commonly biased in favor
of  developed countries.
The concept of  S&D was changed(29), its scope was restricted; it was a reflection of
the poor willingness on the part of  developed countries to continue granting special
treatment, particularly to middle-income countries. This is evidenced by the express
implementation of  grading mechanisms, similar to what was already being unilaterally
done with GSP beneficiaries. The focus was then shifted towards LDCs, as already
contemplated in the general framework of  the multilateral system, Article XI:2 of  the
WTO Agreement.
Clearly, the WTO’s evolution towards the inclusion of  beyond-the-borders issues
was not accompanied by a similar evolution of  the instruments implementing the S&D
concept. In this case, one had to make do with texts containing vague and ambiguous
general S&D provisions, while only some specific provisions in certain agreements have
binding effect, mostly those related to extended implementation terms. Thus, in the
agreements currently in effect, the S&D provisions clearly establishing rights and
(26) Steinberg (2002), supra note 10.
(27) E. Tempone (2007).
(28) K. Fukasaku (2000).
(29) About the difference between S&D before and after the Uruguay Round, see Whalley (1999).
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obligations enforceable against the dispute resolution system are those related to longer
transition periods for implementation of  obligations; and flexibility with some obligations
and procedures, in addition to certain provisions on technical assistance(30).
This is not enough if  we consider the strong implications of  multilateral trade rules
on a developing economy, as there are no S&D provisions capable of  overcoming the anti-
development impact of  several provisions in multilateral agreements, such as TRIPs,
TRIMs, and the Agreement on Subsidies, which at times seem to invert the reasoning and
grant special treatment to developed countries(31).
In short, the main idea behind the new S&D seems to involve merely affording room
for adjustment and implementation of  the new, controversial rules; a far cry from a genuine
concern for the development of  LDCs.
However, the discussion on S&D, which seemed to be living on borrowed time, was
growing in importance once again, in the years of  implementation of  the Marrakech
agreements, when many developing countries became fully aware of  how biased UR
agreements were in favor of  developed countries. On their part, the US and the European
Union wanted to continue moving forward in the advancement of  the Marrakech
agreements, and with that in mind they proposed a new Round. Developing countries, on
the other hand, unhappy with the outcome of  the UR that did little for their development
needs, accepted the offer, subject to prior exclusion of  such issues as the environment and
employment, and under the condition that the mandate of  the new round should be as
comprehensive as possible to include their interests and development needs(32).
Thus, the Doha Development Round was launched in 2001 at the Doha Ministerial
Conference. The Doha Declaration, paragraph 44, provided that S&D provisions are part
of  WTO Agreements and that particular attention will be paid to them, in an effort to
reinforce them and make them more accurate, effective, and operational.
From then on, the S&D continued moving forward along two related paths. The
first one involved the commitments already undertaken at the UR and their development,
which in practice meant an important restriction in the S&D universe of  application and
their beneficiaries. The other path moved around the speeches and negotiations under way
at the Doha Round. The following section will map those two paths.
Implementation of  the special and differential treatment provisions in the specific
agreements of  the Uruguay Round: increasing restriction
(30) For considerations on the binding effect of S&DT provisions, see Kessie (2000), supra note 17, among others.
Additionally, other authors have classified the S&DT provisions contained in the Marrakech agreements. See
Fukusaku (2000), supra note 28; Hoekman (2005, p. 405-424); Kessie (2000), supra note 17; Kleen; Page (2004),
supra note 13; Stevens, C. (2003). In turn, the WTO has also established a classification that will be described
below.
(31) Some examples of  the referred bias in the special treatment afforded to developed countries include quotas on
textiles, agricultural subsidies, the agreement on subsidies (where the subsidies allowed are adequate for industri-
alized countries), or the restrictions on the competition policy allowed under the TRIPs Agreement. See Singh
(2005), supra note 18.
(32) Steinberg (2002), supra note 10.
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On one hand, this section will identify the situation of  middle-income developing
countries and LDCs(33), in relation to the S&D provisions believed to have greater binding
effect, that is to say, extended terms for agreement implementation and flexibility in their
application. On the other hand, its purpose is to identify the S&D provisions under
negotiation at the Doha Round.
To this end, a mapping will be conducted on the actual scope of  the S&D in three of
the Uruguay Round agreements: the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
— SCM, the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures — TRIMs, and the TRIPs
Agreement. In addition, the agenda of  the special session of  the Committee on Trade and
Development will be studied; this Committee is responsible for conducting the S&D
negotiations in the round currently under way.
THE AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES — SCM
Let us see a summary of  the S&D situation in the Agreement on Subsidies from the
effective date of  the WTO Agreement to the present day(34).
Box I — Differentiated terms and extensions for developing
countries and LDCs under the SCM Agreement
Flexibilities for Developing Countries in the Doha Round as À La Carte Special and Differential Treatment: Retracing the Uruguay Steps?
(33) According to the list of the United Nations — UN; Economic and Social Council — ECOSOC.
(34) September 2009.
(35) The countries listed under b) above are included on the basis of  the most recent data on GNP per inhabitant.
Art. 27,
paragraphs
1 and 2;
Annex VII
Subsidies subject
to use of  national
products
Subsidies subject
to exportation
Adaptation period: 5 years, non-
renewable.
- Adaptation period: 8 years,
renewable.
- Some developing countries are not
subject to this 8-year term until
their GDP per capita reaches 1,000
dollars per annum(35): Bolivia,
Cameroon, Congo, Ivory Coast,
Egypt, Philippines, Ghana,
Guatemala, Guyana, India,
Indonesia, Kenya, Morocco,
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan,
Dominican Republic, Senegal, Sri
Lanka, and Zimbabwe. The 8-year
term will then start to run in
relation to them.
Adaptation period: 8
years, non-
renewable.
Prohibition of use of
those subsidies shall
not apply to LDCs,
as so designated by
the United Nations.
SCM Developing countries LDC
prolam 16.pmd 19/10/2010, 15:32173
174
Source: own elaboration based on official WTO documents (http://docsonline.wto.org).
The following observations may be made from the above mapping.
1. EXTENSION OF TRANSITION PERIODS
First, according to article 27 of  the SCM Agreement, the transition period and its
potential extension applied to all developing countries. Additionally, it established no
conditions other than the deadline for submission of  applications for extension (December
2001) and the review by the SCM Committee. Nevertheless, a very reduced group of
countries requested an extension. Even fewer were those who obtained the requested
extension and none of  them is among those considered competitive developing countries.
This is due to the fact that, during the Doha Ministerial Conference and supported by the
Ministerial Declaration itself, the SCM Committee approved a document establishing the
country profile and subsidy programs entitled to an extension (G/SCM/39), thus
restricting the scope of  article 27. In fact, conditions are so strict that they virtually
exclude all middle-income developing countries. These conditions include: share of  world
merchandise export trade not greater than 0.10 per cent; Gross National Income of  no
more than US$20 billion. Moreover, those which obtained an extension were almost all
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Art. 27,
paragraph 4
Term for
application for
extension
December 31, 2001.
- Extension: Antigua and Barbuda,
Barbados, Belize, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Dominica, El Salvador, Fiji,
Granada, Guatemala, Jamaica,
Jordan, Mauritius, Panama, Papua
New Guinea, Dominican Republic,
Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent
and the Grenadines, Saint Lucia,
Surinam, Thailand, and Uruguay.
- Reservation of  rights: Bolivia,
Honduras, Kenya, and Sri Lanka.
- Antigua and Barbuda; Barbados;
Belize; Costa Rica; Dominica; El
Salvador; Fiji; Granada; Guatemala;
Jamaica; Jordan; Mauritius; Panama;
Papua New Guinea; Dominican
Republic; Saint Kitts and Nevis;
Saint Lucia; Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines; and Uruguay.
- Reservation of  rights: Bolivia,
Honduras, Kenya, and Sri Lanka.
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
SCM Developing countries LDC
Applications for extension or
reservation of  rights
Countries that were granted
an extension for years
2003-2007 and benefited
from the extension
procedure, 2008-2012 period
[General Council Decision
(WT/L/691)]
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the countries having free zone activity as their fundamental tool for the insertion in
international trade. In brief, these are countries that would have no other alternative for
positioning themselves in the international trade if  it were not for certain programs aiding
their exportations. Even in relation to that restricted group of  countries, the General
Council adopted a decision in 2007 (WT/L/691) establishing the maximum period —
December 2015 — to continue adopting those subsidies.
2. RESERVATION OF RIGHTS
On the other hand, although it has established restricted conditions in comparison
to article 27 of  the SCM, the procedure approved by the Committee (G/SCM/39) declares,
in paragraph 7, that its provisions shall not affect the rights set forth in the SCM Agreement,
nor do they serve as precedent for any purposes. This paragraph might serve as a window
enabling a request for extension by the developing countries that failed to meet the
conditions required under that procedure. However, none of  those countries, except
Thailand, has submitted any request. In addition, in the subsequent procedure (WT/L/
691), there is no reference to the undermining of  the SCM Agreement and it only states
that it makes no judgment about the rights of  members making a reservation of  rights,
that is, Bolivia, Honduras, Kenya, and Sri Lanka.
It seems that these provisions worked more as a reservation of  rights with a view to
conducting future negotiations rather than as an exercisable right, while the current
scenario does not seem to have changed for exercise of  those rights, particularly by middle-
income developing countries.
THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED INVESTMENT MEASURES — TRIMS
The map of  TRIMs looks as follows:
Box II — Differentiated terms and extensions for
developing countries and LCDs under the TRIMs Agreement
Flexibilities for Developing Countries in the Doha Round as À La Carte Special and Differential Treatment: Retracing the Uruguay Steps?
General Rule Notification obligation: article 5, paragraph 1 and Decision WT/L/
64: A term of  90 days from the effective date of  the WTO Agreement
is granted to notify all TRIMs in effect that are not in conformity
with the Agreement. For new members, there is a term of  90 days as
from the date of  acceptance of  the WTO Agreement. (Decision WT/
L/64)
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Source: own elaboration based on official WTO documents (http://docsonline.wto.org)
1. THE DOHA MANDATE FOR TRIMS
This issue was the object of discussions in Doha in 2001 and the Decision on the
matters and concerns regarding application (WT/MIN(01)/17) ratified the possibility to
extend the transition period, particularly for LDCs. However, as may be seen in box II, no
LDC requested an extension and, although some middle-income developing countries did
so, the extension was granted only by the end of  2003. In 2004, Argentina, for example,
submitted an application which was rejected.
Even in Doha, according to paragraph 12 of  the Ministerial Declaration, pending
matters — including proposals related to the TRIMs Agreement — would be made part
of  the work program. The main proposal on the matter is included in the working paper
Job (01)152/Rev.1 and its content may be summarized as follows: 1. it is proposed that
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Rules for
developing
countries and
LDCs
Transition
period
Article 5,
paragraph 2:
Transition
period
extension
Article 5,
paragraph 3:
Developing countries
Grant of  extension
Measures in favor of  LDCs in
Hong Kong (Annex F of  General
Council Decision, WT/MIN(05/
DEC, of  12/22/2005)
They shall eliminate the
notified TRIMs in a term of  5
years from the effective date of
the WTO Agreement.
The transition period for
developing countries may be
extended, subject to the Goods
Council’s approval and
fulfillment of  certain
requirements.
- Until May 2003: Romania
- Until June 2003: The
Philippines
- Until December 2003:
Argentina; Colombia;
Malaysia; Mexico; Pakistan;
Thailand.
Not applicable
LDC
They shall eliminate
the notified TRIMs
in a term of  7 years
from the effective
date of  the WTO
Agreement.
The transition
period for LDCs may
be extended, subject
to the Goods
Council’s approval
and fulfillment of
certain
requirements.
None
Ability to adopt
measures not
compatible with the
Agreement, subject
to prior notice, for a
term of  6 years for
already existing
measures; 5 years for
new measures.
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developing countries have another opportunity to notify existing trade-related investment
measures (TRIMs) and make use of  a new transition period; 2. it is stated that extension
rules should be properly amended and should be mandatory; 3. it is proposed that developing
countries be exempted from obligations related to domestic content; and 4. it is stated that
the TRIMs Agreement should be flexible enough for developing countries to be able to
apply development policies.
In 2002, a report by the Committee Chairman to the General Council (G/L/588)
opposed this proposal. According to the Chairman, the TRIMs Agreement already offered
enough flexibility to respond to the concerns of  developing countries.
Part of  those issues is still on the agenda, due to the insistence of  Brazil and India (G/
C/W/428 G/TRIMS/W/25), which submitted proposals on development policies. To this
date, these proposals are still being discussed, but they have not been submitted for formal
consideration yet (G/TRIMS/M/20). According to subsequent reports, since 2005 it has
been recommended that the issue be the object of  political debate, given the disagreements
among members, which prevent finding common ground at the technical level.
The African group also submitted a proposal in relation to TRIMs (TN/CTD/W/
3/Rev.2), which considers such issues as balance of  payments and transition periods.
According to the reports by the Committee Chairman to the General Council, except for
certain aspects concerning balance of  payment issues, most of  the proposal is not achieving
consensus. It is recommended that discussions should continue.
The perspective for LDCs improved in Hong Kong. There, 5 provisions in favor of
that country group were approved, thus enabling the adoption of  measures incompatible
with the agreement, renewable on prior request.
Regarding the other issues, and although there has been renewed enthusiasm — due
to the drafting of  revised proposals that were discussed — after Hong Kong, the agenda
soon came to a standstill again, as evidenced by the 2006, 2007, and 2008 reports.
Thus, while the S&D issues that in practice favored developing countries continue to
lack consensus for approval, the decisions that are in fact approved have been increasingly
restrictive, including only LDCs. But, why is it that in a matter that is so important for
development, as it is the case with investment measures, the great majority of  developing
countries has not even attempted to obtain an extension? And why is it that no LDC
attempted to do so either before the Hong Kong Ministerial?
First of  all, LDCs requested no extension for two reasons. On one hand, some were
not significantly affected by the limitations imposed by the TRIMs(36). As a matter of  fact,
in their current development stage, investment is welcome regardless of  its origin or
purpose. Besides, in practice, it is very difficult for those countries to impose limitations
on such flows. That is, in general, LDCs have not made use of  any investment measures
incompatible with the TRIMs (domestic content requirement, limitations on imports, etc.)
due to the absence of  effective enforcement mechanisms, but particularly because of  a
lack of  interest, as they do not have a domestic industrial capacity that would benefit from
such measures. On the other hand, the countries that were in fact affected promoted the
approval of  measures in their favor, such as the Hong Kong decision.
(36) A. Di Caprio; A. Amsden (2004).
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Secondly, middle-income developing countries continue to insist on the debate, but
they have not appeared in large numbers to apply for extensions either. Brazil and India’s
proposals are more of  an attempt to maintain the issue of  development policies on the
agenda, rather than a reaction by countries actually affected by the Agreement limitations.
To a great extent, this is due to the fact that virtually all of  those countries are part
of  regional integration agreements, at least at the Free Trade Zone level, and that the
domestic content requirement, considered as an incompatible measure under TRIMs rules,
it is present in those integration processes as a regionally-established rule. Thus, the old
domestic content requirement, now forbidden under TRIMs, has been turned into a
powerful tool by the name of  “regional content rules”(37). The rules of  origin are, in addition,
compatible with WTO agreements, as they are necessary to certify the origin of  products
in transit in the “intrazone”. From this standpoint, the TRIMs prohibition was to a great
extent neutralized by regional commercial integration agreements, while LDCs benefited
from provisional exemptions.
THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS — TRIPS
In relation to intellectual property, let us analyze the following chart:
Box III — Differentiated terms for developing countries and the
LCDs under the TRIPs Agreement
(37) M.T. Gutierrez-Haces (1998).
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General Rule
Specific rules
Application for/
Grant of  extension
Doha Mandate on
extensions under
TRIPs
Maldives Islands:
- Application for extension: August 2004.
- Grant of  extension: until December 2007.
Paragraph 7 of  the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreements and
Public Health and Decision of  the TRIPs Council (IP/C/25):
Member LCDs shall have no obligation in relation to pharmaceutical
products for Patents of  Invention and Protection of  Information
not disclosed until January 1, 2016.
Transition period: article 65, paragraph 1: No Member shall be under
an obligation to apply the Agreement for a general term of  1 year from
the effective date of  the WTO Agreement.
Developing countries
LCDs:
Transition period:
article 65, paragraph
1: 4 additional years.
Transition period
for non-protected
technology sectors:
article 65, paragraph
4: additional period
of 5 years.
Transition period: article 66, paragraph 1: 10 additional years
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1. TRANSITION PERIODS
As may be seen, the S&D provisions contained in the TRIPs — except for the Doha
initiative on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health — were in practice the least effective
ones. That is an indication of  the extent of  pressure exercised on developing countries to
prevent them from extending their transition periods(38). In fact, although both Argentina
and Brazil — for example — could have exercised the right to use the additional four-year
transition period [Article 65(4)] for some sectors, they waived this right. As a matter of
fact, Maldives Islands were the only country applying for an extension.
2. COMPULSORY LICENSES AND AMENDMENT TO TRIPS
In addition to transition periods, the Doha Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and
Public Health introduced a subject that raised intense discussions among developing countries,
LDCs, and developed countries. It is paragraph 6 of  the Declaration, which is about the
difficulties faced by the countries that are unable to make effective use of  compulsory licenses
because they lack manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector.
In September 2003, the TRIPs Committee issued a decision (WT/L/5402), that
partially resolved the matter, granting exemptions for certain obligations under the
Agreement for some countries to be able to export pharmaceutical products to those
countries in need of  capacity — or with insufficient capacity — to satisfy their domestic
demand. This same decision provides for the drafting of  an amendment to the TRIPs
including that possibility, which was achieved in 2005 under Decision WT/L/641 amending
the TRIPs Agreement and leaving its acceptance at members’ discretion(39). By early 2009,
the protocol had been accepted by 21 countries, including Brazil and India.
As regards other S&D provisions, news are not that good. From all proposals submitted,
it was only possible to move on with the drafting of  one paragraph, similar to the African
Group proposal on the difference between exclusive trade rights and patent rights.
THE WTO DEBATE ON S&D
At the WTO, absent a framework agreement on S&D, progress and deliberations on
the subject are fragmented into countless provisions under specific agreements, as well as
into several negotiation proposals in special sessions of  the Committee on Trade and
(38) Shadlen (2009), supra note 1.
(39) This alternative favors developing countries that have the capacity to export drugs, such as Brazil or India.
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Extension of  the transition period set forth in article 70(9) in relation
to pharmaceutical products: Application of  the obligations of  Member
LDCs under paragraph 9 of  article 70 of  the Agreement will be
suspended in relation to pharmaceutical products until January 1, 2016.
General Council
Decision WT/l/ 478
(12.7.2002)
Source: own elaboration based on official WTO documents (http://docsonline.wto.org).
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Development (CTD or Committee). This section will go over the issues under negotiation
in the special session of  the Committee.
Since February 2002, the CTD has been working hard on such issues as the review
of  S&D provisions in the specific agreements to construe them in a way that reinforces
them and makes them more efficient; the review of  proposals for a framework agreement
on S&D, in addition to identifying those provisions that are mandatory and the consequences
from conversion of  the measures that are currently not binding into mandatory provisions, all
of  which should be in conformity with the mandate of  paragraph 44 of  the Doha Declaration
and paragraph 12.1 of  the Declaration on issues and concerns regarding the application of
Doha(40). Since then, the task involves submitting a report with recommendations to the General
Council for a decision to be adopted on the matter, initially, no later than on March 31, 2003,
pursuant to the mandate of  paragraph 14 in the Doha Declaration.
On the basis of  the review of  the Committee’s reports, we can observe that the Committee
worked continuously up until 2008, but the terms were postponed as negotiations progressed
in the round and the issue suffered several modifications that will be described below.
Before starting to work, upon the request of  certain countries, the WTO Secretariat
was instructed to disclose the information on the application of  S&D provisions by the
members, in order to facilitate the Committee’s work(41). Additionally, S&D provisions
were divided into five groups, namely: provisions to increase trade opportunities through
market access; those requiring that members safeguard the interests of  developing
countries; those allowing for certain flexibilities to developing countries in the application
or rules and disciplines; those authorizing longer transition periods for developing countries
and technical assistance provisions.
After this, discussions continued to deal with proposals for specific agreements and
transversal and systemic proposals. The goal was to arrive at the Cancun Ministerial with
recommendations to the General Council to be included in the text of  the Declaration. In
the sessions that followed until Cancun, the surveillance mechanism that would be
responsible for monitoring compliance with S&D provisions in WTO agreements was
included in the debate as a proposal of  the African Group. In the last stage of  sessions
until December 2003, the Committee worked intensively under the chair of  South African
Faizel Ismail, who replaced Jamaican Ransford Smith. By the time of  the Cancun
Ministerial, there was a proposal to add Annex C to the Ministerial draft containing the
proposals agreed upon. However, neither the Annex nor the text was adopted in the
Ministerial. At that time, the attention focused on agriculture, market access in NAMA,
cotton and the Singapore issues, thus leaving the discussion on S&D temporarily on hold,
also expecting to find more common ground among countries.
The main disagreements until Cancun involved cross-cutting issues, such as S&D
principles and objectives, the mandatory or non-mandatory nature of  technical assistance,
the enabling clause and graduation, differentiation among developing countries to allow
for a one-, two-, or three-tier structure of  rights and obligations, as well as the structure
and scope of  the surveillance mechanism.
(40) Available on: <www.wto.org> Last accessed on: 9.5.2009.
(41) Document WT/COMTD/36.
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After Cancun, upon the Chairman’s initiative, works were resumed through specific
questions to members on how to move forward with the S&D. There was disagreement,
but not on the requirement that the july 2004 package should have a clear-cut development
component.
According to the July package (WT/L/579), concerns on development and S&D
provisions are part of  the Doha Ministerial Declaration and WTO agreements, respectively.
Furthermore, it recommended that progress should be made on pending proposals for
provisions in specific agreements and should comprise all other pending works, including
those in relation to transversal issues, the surveillance mechanism, and incorporation of
the special and differential treatment to the WTO rules structure, also submitting the
pertaining reports. It further recommends to all WTO bodies before which proposals on
S&D have been submitted that they forthwith complete their review and also submit a
report to that body, with clear recommendations for adoption of  a decision, with a view to
the Hong Kong Ministerial.
From then on, given the short term remaining until the Ministerial, the priority in
search for consensus on pending issues turned to those involving LDCs, in addition to
concluding the proposals in specific agreements to then arrive at the Hong Kong General
Council with proposals. During that time, however, negotiations once again stumbled upon
the following dilemma: transversal issues vs. specific issues. The priority afforded to LDCs
also failed to remove conflict from the debate on these questions. Many developed countries
were concerned about the automatic nature of  concessions, also proposing that flexibilities
should be temporary and be granted based on a jointly examined need. Furthermore, they
believed the general exemptions and the mandatory nature of  technical assistance were
unacceptable.
On the eve of  the Hong Kong Ministerial, there was no consensus except for some
proposals on specific agreements. The proposals on S&D forwarded to other WTO bodies
were not progressing either. A political decision was needed and the technical work seemed
to have been exhausted, as diagnosed by some members. A decision was made to forward
the draft text consented to by the majority, in addition to all minority proposals. A political
decision was requested on the adoption of  issues already agreed upon, the priority question
of  LDCs, and a clear directive on pending works.
In reply, ministers renewed the commitment to S&D at the Round, adopted five
decisions in favor of  LDCs, and instructed the CTD to complete works by the end of
2006. Undoubtedly, the most important element in the Declaration was the decision in
favor of  LDCs, as they moved beyond wishful thinking and the setting of  to-be-extended
terms.
Moreover, the Ministerial Declaration of  Hong Kong indicated specific points on
S&D with respect to developing countries, such as paragraph 24 of  the document, or the
principle of  less than full reciprocity, as will be seen in the following section.
Afterward, the Committee’s works, under the chair of  Singapore ambassadors and
then Thailand ambassadors, were initially focused on operationalizing decisions in favor
of  LDCs. In this sense, LDCs were particularly interested in moving on with the provisions
on duty-free and quota-free market access and greater transparency in rules of  origin.
Flexibilities for Developing Countries in the Doha Round as À La Carte Special and Differential Treatment: Retracing the Uruguay Steps?
prolam 16.pmd 19/10/2010, 15:32181
182
Progress was made on the first issue and, by mid 2007, the CTD declared that several
developed countries were already complying with the duty exemption in at least 97% of
LDCs’ exports. Pending work involved including the remaining 3%, which according to
LDCs representatives it is the most relevant portion of  their exports, and also causing
developing countries that are able to do so to grant that benefit to least-developed ones.
Regarding rules of  origin, however, no such progress is observed. According to many
members, that is an issue where at present progress on common standards and transparency
criteria is unlikely, which leads to the conclusion that the same will happen at the CTD,
where the matter is in fact deadlocked.
In the work on specific agreement provisions, by 2008, consensus had been achieved
in only 6 out the 28 proposals on which there was preliminary agreement, from a total of
88 proposals submitted.
Finally, in relation to transversal issues, the only proposal that has survived along
the years was that concerning the surveillance mechanism, although there is no comfortable
margin of  consensus on whether this mechanism should only deal with any provisions
potentially approved after the start of  Doha or whether it should consider all provisions,
including the Marrakech agreements.
To offer a clearer idea on the restriction of  the S&D agenda in CTD negotiations after
Doha, below is a breakdown of  the Committee’s agenda by year, up until December 2008.
Box IV – Agenda of  the Committee on Trade and Development
in special session, from February 2002 to December 2008
(42) This mandate includes the S&D decisions discussed at the CTD. This does not include the flexibilities in
NAMA, Agriculture or Services, to name only a few.
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2002-2003
(Cancun)
2003-2005
(Hong Kong)
Initial Doha Mandate: review of  S&D provisions in specific agreements to
reinforce them and make them more effective; review of  proposals for a framework
agreement on S&D; identification of  mandatory provisions and the consequences
from conversion of  the measures that are not currently binding into mandatory
ones. To adopt decisions on the matter no later than March 31, 2003 (paragraphs
44 and 14 of  the Doha Ministerial Declaration and paragraph 12.1 of  the
Declaration on issues and concerns related to the application of  Doha).
Issues discussed:
- Proposals for provisions in specific agreements (28)
- mandatory or non-mandatory nature of  provisions and their consequences
- principles and objectives of  S&D
- difference among developing countries
- surveillance mechanism
- priority to LDCs
- technical and financial assistance and building of  capabilities
- incorporation of  the S&D into the WTO’s structure of  rules
Hong Kong Mandate(42): initial Doha mandate with extended terms, july
2004 package, and Ministerial Declaration of  Hong Kong
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Source: own elaboration based on CTD reports from 2002 to 2008, available at: <http://docsonline.wto.org> and
the WTO website: <www.wto.org>.
2003-2005
(Hong Kong)
2005-2008
Issues discussed:
- proposals for provisions in specific agreements (16)
- measures for duty-free and quota-free market access and rules of  origin
- proposals forwarded to other WTO bodies
- surveillance mechanism
- incorporation of  the S&D into the WTO’s structure of  rules
Current Mandate: Hong Kong mandate, with extended terms Issues
discussed:
- proposals for provisions in specific agreements (6)
- surveillance mechanism
- measures for duty-free and quota-free market access
Unsurprisingly, as an example of  what has been going on with term renegotiation,
the S&D is being restricted in the negotiations currently under way at the Committee on
Trade and Development, in Doha. The only consensus achieved involved few proposals on
specific agreement provisions, measures in favor of  LDCs, and the general basis for a
surveillance mechanism, while all other aspects that were being discussed at the beginning
of  the Round at the CTD seem to have been lost along the way.
There were some achievements, as is the case of  specific measures for LDCs or the
Protocol on TRIPs and public health. Additionally, there are certain relevant areas where
the S&D is being negotiated for LDCs. In NAMA, for example, LDCs are exempt from
making concessions, together with other groups of  countries such as small and vulnerable
economies and recently acceded members.
Nonetheless, that would seem little if  compared to the negotiation agenda and the
mandate at the start of  the Round. Moreover, that type of  particular measure does not
contribute to the S&D cause because, firstly, the laissez faire policy for LDCs will not help
them find a course for development unless it is coupled with technical assistance, technology
transfer, and other substantial measures. Secondly, because it manages to divide the
developing world into those already enjoying guaranteed preferences and other benefits
— and which, consequently, reduce their demands — and the other countries that have
been excluded from those benefits.
One final issue worth mentioning is that, at present, there is virtually no participation
by some middle-income countries at the Committee on Trade and Development. And
given that in the multilateral trading system nothing is lost, nothing is created, everything
is transformed, the fact is that the search for flexibilities by those countries should be at a
different level, under other names, as mentioned in the rules of  regional origin and their
relationship to TRIMs, for example.
Along these lines, the next section will identify the most relevant areas where middle-
income countries are moving forward in the search for flexibilities in the Doha negotiations,
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especially those most involved in the G-20 and NAMA 11, two coalitions reflecting two
particularly interesting areas for these countries: Agriculture and NAMA (Non-
Agricultural Market Access).
FLEXIBILITIES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: À LA CARTE SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL
TREATMENT
Much has been said about the participation of  developing countries in the multilateral
trading system. The first prevailing view asserts that developing countries participated in the
GATT only to negotiate an exemption from their obligations, whether it be because they
pursued import substitution industrialization and/or because they sought free-riding. In
contrast, the second view believes that developing countries were some passive players under
GATT, due to their lack of  expertise or political representation to participate more fully.
Others claim that during the GATT, the participation of  developing countries in the
multilateral system was relatively reduced, whether because GATT was a system aimed at
the interests of  developed countries and developing countries did not believe it could
serve their interests, or because they had a reduced presence in world trade — such reduced
presence results in their exclusion from the system and vice versa — as indicated by the
WTO itself(43).
According to Wilkinson & Scott(44), the problem is that those prevailing views do not
fully account for the participation of  developing countries in the GATT. As opposed to
what is usually held, developing countries had an active involvement — as described in
the first section of  this paper; they made efforts to make rules appropriate to their situation
and they did make concessions. Although it is true that their efforts were generally aimed
at seeking more favorable treatment, this is due to the biased nature of  GATT and of
their underdeveloped status, rather than the mere search for free-riding.
Thus, as a starting point for this section, it is considered that there has been an
increasing participation of  developing countries in the multilateral trading system and
that this participation intended to modify certain unfair rules of  the multilateral trading
system, in addition to help those countries move forward in their development strategies.
In this context, developing countries adopted different strategies throughout the multila-
teral negotiations of  GATT and, subsequently, of  the WTO, which is clearly related to
the fate of  the Special and Differential Treatment in the course of  multilateral system
negotiations.
In an initial stage, when the first S&D provisions were introduced until their peak in the
‘70s, it could be said that developing countries showed a mostly confrontational strategy,
promoting the creation of  the UNCTAD and pushing for the creation of  a new international
economic order. In 1979, at the close of  the Tokyo Round, the push to adopt the Enabling
Clause showed a growing understanding of  rules and a more consensus — concerned strategy.
(43) WTO (2000).
(44) R. Wilkinson; J. Scott (2008).
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While certain progress was attained in making the GATT comprise more flexibilities
to cater to their needs, even before the beginning of  the Uruguay Round, developing
countries started to realize the limitations of  those achievements. As already described in
the first section, developing countries started to perceive that the positive discrimination
they were receiving under S&D was being outdone by an increasing negative discrimination
against their trade, and they set out to seek market access, with the promise that agriculture
would be included in the negotiations. Simultaneously, the UNCTAD was decreasing in
relevance, as a consequence of  the constant reluctance of  developed countries to confer it
any decision power in the international scenario(45), while developing countries were
searching for assistance to leave behind the ‘80s crisis in a context of  marked change of
paradigm towards neoliberalism.
With all these variables at stake, those countries adopted a more cooperative approach,
participated in coalitions together with developed countries (Cairns Group) and accepted
the undertakings and concessions package, also suffering a considerable amount of  pressure
by developed countries to close the Uruguay Round, as already noted in the first section.
The Marrakech agreements were gradually implemented, the debt on agriculture
remained outstanding on the part of  developed countries, and developing countries started
to verify the high cost they were paying for the Uruguay Round. By the late ‘90s, a change
of  strategy was becoming increasingly necessary: on one hand, the strategies aimed at a
change in the international order — through the rejection of  the status quo and the creation
of  a counterhegemonic reality through UNCTAD — did not yield the expected results;
on the other, the collaboration strategies did not yield the expected results either in the
middle of  the difficulties of  the late ‘80s, the search for market access, and an attempt to
obtain some benefit from unilateral opening.
Then, a new offensive by developing countries is observed intended to open a new
negotiation round. Not a “Millennium Round”, with a deepening of  undertakings — as
developed countries desired — but a “Development Round”, with the leveling of  the playing
field and fulfillment of  pending agriculture-related undertakings by developed countries.
The Doha Development Round was launched in 2001, but the most remarkable change
became apparent in 2003, in the Cancun Ministerial, with the creation of  the G-20(46).
The G-20 was born in 2003 out of  a combination of  factors. The feeling that the
WTO was not satisfactorily assisting the interests of  developing countries, particularly
in agricultural issues; the visible gap existing between the Doha undertaking in agriculture
and the draft under negotiation; the US and EU position to continue trying to get greater
levels of  undertaking by developing countries, while they submitted a framework proposal
in agriculture that was not only restricted in relation to their own undertakings but also
totally contrary to round objectives(47).
(45) One of the devices used to that end involved having all of UNCTAD’s initiatives be implemented through
other already existing forums.
(46) The G-20 consists of: Argentina; Bolivia; Brazil; Chile; China; Cuba; Ecuador; Egypt; Philippines; Guatemala;
India; Indonesia; Mexico; Nigeria; Pakistan; Paraguay; Peru; South Africa; Thailand; Tanzania; Uruguay; Venezue-
la; Zimbabwe.
(47) Uzquiza, L. G. (2009, p. 12).
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It should be noted that the present coalitions (after the Doha Round) are rather
different from the more confrontational coalitions of  the ‘60s-‘70s, like the G-77 for instance.
While they maintain the substantial idea that developing countries share problems and
needs that must be collectively addressed, coalitions such as the G-20 are not asking for
the substitution of  the WTO with another institution, they are not advancing on an
alternative idea to the export-oriented insertion model, but what they promote is a change
from within the WTO and not the construction of  another regime(48).
In general terms, the WTO suffered the distrust of  developing countries, an
institutional crisis leading to various studies on its reformation(49), which represented an
additional obstacle in the task of  providing a proper response to the change in their
members’ balance of  power. Brazil, India, Argentina, South Africa, among others, appeared
as strong leaders in that coalition. As one of  their major achievements, they imposed
limitations on the US-EU bloc, which had dominated the multilateral trading system
since the times of  the GATT.
From the beginning, it was clear that the G-20 — as well as some other coalitions
subsequently formed, such as NAMA 11(50) — was ready for the great battle: that of
attaining a negotiation favoring their interests, or else they would not accept an agreement
and would prevent the progress of  negotiations and close the Round.
In this context, the S&D — in its more ample conception as a framework agreement
— seems gradually less apt for those “graduated” countries (see second section)(51) and,
though it would be a mistake to assume that the S&D will disappear from the agenda, it is
clear that this issue is the WTO’s great “moving target”(52).
Thus, it is worth analyzing how those countries are being able to establish their
demands in search for flexibility margins in future agreements, so as to understand the
new S&D flexibility layout in relation to those countries.
To this end, it is necessary to understand the dynamics of  the two main negotiations
under way: agriculture and non-agricultural products. This is where the “great battle” of
the WTO lies: finding a balance that is acceptable to everyone between agriculture (domestic
support and market access) and the NAMA (Non-Agricultural Market Access). All other
negotiations in this round are in the waiting line, advancing in minor issues, making no
decisions, executing no agreements, waiting for these negotiations to come to an end.
Negotiation of  the flexibilities of  these modalities responds to a liberalization
criterion for “less than full reciprocity”, to respond to the more general requirements of
the Development Round, and the balance between agriculture and NAMA, set forth in
(48) Tussie (2010), supra note 16, p. 18.
(49) See the Sutherland Report requested by the WTO and the comments in relation to, quoted by Tempone
(2007), supra note 27.
(50) NAMA 11 members are: Argentina; Brazil; Egypt; Philippines; India; Indonesia; Namibia; Bolivarian Republic
of  Venezuela; South Africa; Tunisia.
(51) In fact, at the Committee on Trade and Development, those countries are required to grant special treatment
to LDCs.
(52) Tórtora (2003, p. 7).
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paragraph 24 of  Hong Kong, as a general rule. As a specific rule, each country or group
of  countries is negotiating its particular flexibilities.
In NAMA, there are not many countries that will be applying the general tariff
reduction (the so-called “Swiss formula” with coefficients). Most member countries,
especially developing countries, are part of  some exception, whether it be because they
are LDCs, small and vulnerable economies, recently acceded members (RAMs), transition
economies, highly indebted countries, small islands, landlocked countries, etc.
Among the countries that will be applying the formula, many are negotiating
flexibilities in addition to the general ones deriving from the general rule on less that full
reciprocity and balance with agriculture. MERCOSUR, for instance, negotiated an
additional flexibility consisting of  a list of  exceptions that will not be included in the
tariff reduction.
While the current draft for NAMA has been accepted by Brazil (with inclusion of
the additional flexibility for MERCOSUR) and India (that requested no additional
flexibility), Argentina and South Africa are carrying on with negotiations.
Argentina believes that the current draft does not satisfy the general requirements
of  less than full reciprocity and balance between agriculture and NAMA, and is negotiating
a clause for its exceptional position.
In turn, South Africa points out that in the Uruguay Round it made concessions in
NAMA equivalent to those of  a developed country and, therefore, it should be allowed to
offer a lesser deepening of  its undertakings under this modality, and that is why its
particular case is still subject to negotiation.
Some other groups of  developing countries are also trying to adapt to this scenario,
like Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, or Costa Rica; these are small economies, although they do
not fall into the “small and vulnerable” category and fear that preferences might be
undermined by the special flexibilities to this type of  countries. Additionally, countries
like Paraguay are actively demanding special flexibilities to landlocked countries.
In agriculture, the situation is somewhat different. In the G-20 there are at least two
groups: offensive net exporting countries — led by Brazil — and defensive net importing
countries — led by India and China.
Countries like Brazil and Argentina want to deepen the undertakings on domestic
support (the greatest obstacle being the United States) as well as on market access measures
(the greatest obstacle being the European Union), while India is more interested in elimi-
nating domestic support measures because there are many obstacles for access to its market.
In order to keep the common denominator in the G-20 and reconcile all interests
involved(53), these countries have focused their efforts against domestic support measures,
letting the US be the country focusing on attempting to reduce the obstacles to market
access, particularly for European markets.
(53) As a matter of fact, Brazil and India conducted a thorough review on their agricultural profiles and proposals
to analyze the compatibility of their positions, prior to G-20 formation. See Uzquiza (2009, p. 15), supra note 47.
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In this context, it appears that negotiations are bound to conclude, and there will be
certain flexibilities tailored to the needs of  developing countries, while there are still
doubts about whether the package would be approved by the United States and the
European Union. Is it possible for the USA to obtain negotiating mandate in the middle
of  such a deep crisis? Could this round, in the short term, reach consensus between USA
and EU with regard to agricultural subsidies — the main problem for USA — and barriers
to market access — the main problem for EU?
CONCLUSIONS
This paper was intended to accomplish two closely related objectives. On one hand,
to identify how S&D has been dealt with in the multilateral system, from its inception
under GATT to the present negotiations in Doha. On the other, to identify how middle-
income developing countries like Brazil, Argentina, India, and South Africa have positioned
themselves in this context, where S&D is being increasingly considered an issue for LDCs.
The heart of  this debate is the power relationship among states at international
organizations, the world’s division into North-South, into developed countries vs.
developing countries, as well as the increasing fragmentation of  developing countries.
These issues are reflected on the debate around the flexibilities that LDCs must have to
make up for the asymmetry in international economic relations and to have room to promote
development strategies.
The theoretical views on this matter range from structuralist approaches — according
to which the GATT/WTO is seen as a multilateral trading system created to support and
respond to the interests of  most industrialized countries, such as the USA, the European
Union, Japan, Canada, to the detriment of  developing countries(54) — to institutionalist
views, according to which the GATT/WTO represents an opportunity for developing
countries to obtain more favorable results in the international scenario, thanks to the fact
that the WTO is strongly rule-oriented(55).
Between those two views, there is a series or more heterodox approaches claiming
that in asymmetrical relationships, the weak are not always doomed to fail in their demands
and that the outcome of  international negotiations can be influenced by developing
countries(56). Additionally, others state that the WTO uses a mixed dynamics of  rules and
power, where power outweighs rules in critical times, such as at the closing of  multilateral
negotiation rounds(57).
Mixed views are quite appropriate to understand the situation of  the Special and
Differential Treatment at the WTO. It can be observed that, on one hand, the S&D is
being restricted to the so-called middle-income countries, while on the other, those countries
continue seeking and obtaining flexibilities they deem necessary in the multilateral trading
(54) Tanzimuddin Khan (2004, p. 13), supra note 6.
(55) Shadlen (2009, p. 6), supra note 1.
(56) I. W. Zartman; J. Z. Rubin (2002), supra note 9; Page (2002, p. 1).
(57) Steinberg (2002), supra note 10.
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system according to their development perspective, with some amount of  help from the
WTO’s own rules.
On one hand, the S&D provisions of  the Uruguay Round have had an increasingly
restrictive interpretation and did not have the expected impact on the development agenda.
In the agreements analyzed, it is possible to see a tendency to restrict, in practice, those
provisions to LDCs and, to a lesser extent, to other developing countries in a less
advantageous situation, excluding the more developed developing countries of  middle-
level income. Moreover, in the negotiations currently under way, the initial S&D agenda
at the Committee on Trade and Development (in special session) when the Doha Round
was launched was ample and comprehensive — mandatory or non-mandatory nature of
provisions and their consequences; S&D principles and objectives; technical and financial
assistance and training of  capacities; S&D incorporation into WTO rule structure. Today,
this agenda is limited to implementation of  measures in favor of  LDCs, a surveillance
mechanism, and some S&D proposals for specific agreements.
Many of  the developing countries that were being excluded from S&D benefits during
the implementation of  the Marrakech agreements started fighting for specific flexibilities
on each of  the issues of  critical importance to them, such as agriculture and NAMA, and
thus obtain certain flexibilities matching their respective developing country profiles.
While attempting to attain those results, certain substantial issues in the present
negotiations of  the Doha Round were unveiled. The negotiations are a reflection of  the
change in the world’s balance of  power and the increasing fragmentation of  the developing
world. The WTO, to a large extent, reflects these changes. In fact, it is the first one in
doing it, mostly given that it is the most transparent of  all multilateral organizations, and
it is also the most accountable to its members.
However, the WTO is only the canary in the coal mine that announces the lack of
oxygen: it shows how multilateral organizations are obsolete in this transition phase to a
new global scenario. The times when transatlantic powers bilaterally set the agenda in
multilateral trading system are gone, and the limit comes from the coalitions of  developing
countries or their use of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism. Middle-income and emerging
countries already have the ability to block negotiations and impose certain limitations on
the US-EU bloc, which had dominated the main decisions of  the multilateral trading
system since the times of  the GATT.
Nevertheless, that power is not enough yet to achieve a substantial reformation of
multilateral system rules, even though that does not seem to be the priority objective of
those countries either, at least for the time being. Among them, a more pragmatic view
prevails — confrontation from within the system, an attempt to obtain specific flexibilities,
in view of  the increasing restriction to the provisions identified as “S&D” and a strong
offensive to also achieve more undertakings by developed countries.
At times, this round seems biased to large and medium players. That is also reflected
on the way in which the S&D was managed in relation to LDCs and all the other subsets
of  countries, such as small and vulnerable economies, small islands, landlocked countries,
and the like. The “laissez-faire” approach is unanimously considered as a measure intended
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to cause those countries to give their consent to the round and be silenced in their demands,
while interest is focused somewhere else — on large markets.
In the middle of  these considerations, there does not seem to be any more room for
a grand or over-arching framework agreement on S&D, including more binding provisions,
particularly for those developing countries that do not fall into the least developed. The
most likely outcome from all of  the above will be certain tailor-made flexibilities, some
sort of  variable-geometry S&D approach, on a case-by-case basis. To a certain extent,
that would mean undoing the road for a single undertaking at the WTO, agreed upon at
the Uruguay Round, adapting the system to the various needs and capacities of  its members.
Perhaps that unravelling may ease the negotiations but may not be enough in the realm of
trade rules for development.
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